Real Hallucinations: Psychiatric Illness, Intentionality, And The Interpersonal World (philosophical Psychopathology)
by Matthew Ratcliffe /
2017 / English / PDF
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A philosophical account of the structure of experience and how
it depends on interpersonal relations, developed through a study
of auditory verbal hallucinations and thought insertion.
A philosophical account of the structure of experience and how
it depends on interpersonal relations, developed through a study
of auditory verbal hallucinations and thought insertion.
In
InReal Hallucinations
Real Hallucinations, Matthew Ratcliffe offers a
philosophical examination of the structure of human experience,
its vulnerability to disruption, and how it is shaped by
relations with other people. He focuses on the seemingly simple
question of how we manage to distinguish among our experiences of
perceiving, remembering, imagining, and thinking. To answer this
question, he first develops a detailed analysis of auditory
verbal hallucinations (usually defined as hearing a voice in the
absence of a speaker) and thought insertion (somehow experiencing
one's own thoughts as someone else's). He shows how thought
insertion and many of those experiences labeled as
"hallucinations" consist of disturbances in a person's sense of
being in one type of intentional state rather than another.
, Matthew Ratcliffe offers a
philosophical examination of the structure of human experience,
its vulnerability to disruption, and how it is shaped by
relations with other people. He focuses on the seemingly simple
question of how we manage to distinguish among our experiences of
perceiving, remembering, imagining, and thinking. To answer this
question, he first develops a detailed analysis of auditory
verbal hallucinations (usually defined as hearing a voice in the
absence of a speaker) and thought insertion (somehow experiencing
one's own thoughts as someone else's). He shows how thought
insertion and many of those experiences labeled as
"hallucinations" consist of disturbances in a person's sense of
being in one type of intentional state rather than another.
Ratcliffe goes on to argue that such experiences occur against a
backdrop of less pronounced but wider-ranging alterations in the
structure of intentionality. In so doing, he considers forms of
experience associated with trauma, schizophrenia, and profound
grief.
Ratcliffe goes on to argue that such experiences occur against a
backdrop of less pronounced but wider-ranging alterations in the
structure of intentionality. In so doing, he considers forms of
experience associated with trauma, schizophrenia, and profound
grief.
The overall position arrived at is that experience has an
essentially temporal structure, involving patterns of
anticipation and fulfillment that are specific to types of
intentional states and serve to distinguish them
phenomenologically. Disturbances of this structure can lead to
various kinds of anomalous experience. Importantly,
anticipation-fulfillment patterns are sustained, regulated, and
disrupted by interpersonal experience and interaction. It follows
that the integrity of human experience, including the most basic
sense of self, is inseparable from how we relate to other people
and to the social world as a whole.
The overall position arrived at is that experience has an
essentially temporal structure, involving patterns of
anticipation and fulfillment that are specific to types of
intentional states and serve to distinguish them
phenomenologically. Disturbances of this structure can lead to
various kinds of anomalous experience. Importantly,
anticipation-fulfillment patterns are sustained, regulated, and
disrupted by interpersonal experience and interaction. It follows
that the integrity of human experience, including the most basic
sense of self, is inseparable from how we relate to other people
and to the social world as a whole.