Greece: February To April 1941 (australian Army Campaigns Series)
by Michael Tyquin /
2016 / English / PDF
59 MB Download
As with the failed attempt to seize the Gallipoli peninsula in
1915, the allied campaign to assist Greece against a seemingly
invincible German juggernaut was poorly conceived and probably
doomed even as plans were made to assist that country. Like any
campaign, however, it holds lessons for the contemporary student of
strategy, tactics and history. Greece presented singular geographic
difficulties for the defending forces, its mountainous defiles
dictating the distribution of ports, road and rail routes. The
primitive state of the national infrastructure did little to help a
long-term defensive posture. Operations in Greece proved to be a
nightmare, particularly for logistics units, which struggled with
primitive communication systems in rugged terrain over which the
enemy enjoyed total air superiority. Poor liaison between the Greek
and Commonwealth forces did not help matters, nor was the force
deployed adequate for its task. The allies never enjoyed air
superiority, nor could they consolidate any in-depth defense in
time to be effective. The official British history of the campaign
stated that the ‘British campaign on the mainland of Greece was
from start to finish a withdrawal’. Greece: February to April 1941
explores these complexities, and mistakes through the eyes of the
Australian Army Medical Corps.
As with the failed attempt to seize the Gallipoli peninsula in
1915, the allied campaign to assist Greece against a seemingly
invincible German juggernaut was poorly conceived and probably
doomed even as plans were made to assist that country. Like any
campaign, however, it holds lessons for the contemporary student of
strategy, tactics and history. Greece presented singular geographic
difficulties for the defending forces, its mountainous defiles
dictating the distribution of ports, road and rail routes. The
primitive state of the national infrastructure did little to help a
long-term defensive posture. Operations in Greece proved to be a
nightmare, particularly for logistics units, which struggled with
primitive communication systems in rugged terrain over which the
enemy enjoyed total air superiority. Poor liaison between the Greek
and Commonwealth forces did not help matters, nor was the force
deployed adequate for its task. The allies never enjoyed air
superiority, nor could they consolidate any in-depth defense in
time to be effective. The official British history of the campaign
stated that the ‘British campaign on the mainland of Greece was
from start to finish a withdrawal’. Greece: February to April 1941
explores these complexities, and mistakes through the eyes of the
Australian Army Medical Corps.